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THE ROLE OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOMESTIC AIR
CARRIER ROUTE SYSTEM
Whitney Gillilland*
I. Introduction
The major contributors to the development of the system of interstate air
transportation routes which serve this country may be generally divided into four
categories: (1) Those who have provided the vehicles, i.e., the inventors and
manufacturers; (2) the airlines; (3) the public, who demand and use the
services; and (4) the government regulators. This article is addressed to the
evolvement of that system and to the activities of the Civil Aeronautics Board in
two of its several functions. These are (1) formal route licensing and (2)
mergers.' I will allude to some cases not dealing specifically with these two subjects because they relate to a line of decisions.
The Civil Aeronautics Board is to a great degree master of its own calendar.2
From the time of its organization shortly after the passage of the Civil Aeronautics
Act' in 1938, it has exercised substantial control over its docket and has consolidated pending applications4 and set them for hearing5 largely in accord with
its appraisal as to the relative order of public need, rather than to take them up
* Vice-Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board.
1 More than a modicum of scheduled route service is now carried on without benefit of
formal route licensing. The authors of the statute which governs the Board included in it an
"escape valve" for use in special situations. This is the exemption statute (Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 § 416(b). 72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. 1386) which authorizes the Board to exempt air
carriers from formal licensing and other requirements if it finds that enforcement would be an
undue burden on the carriers "by reason of the limited extent of, or unusual circumstances
affecting the operations of such air carrier... and is not in the public interest."
Some scheduled services are performed with benefit of such exemptions. Conspicuous
among them are those provided by carriers defined in the Board's air taxi regulations (C.A.B.,
Economic Regulations, Part 298) as "commuter air carriers" and performed by aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds and officially classified as small aircraft.
These operations were at one time of very limited extent but in recent years the class has
grown rapidly, and indeed precariously for there have been no limitations on entry, business
failures have been frequent, and there being no requirements to continue services, or assurances
of quality, dependability in many instances has been lacking. On the other hand some of these
carriers have succeeded in gaining and in deserving very good reputations.
According to E. H. Pickering, FLIGHT MAGAZINE, Dec. 1969, 29, the number of aircraft
then in scheduled services by 168 commuter carriers was 887. This appears to be on the order
of three times that of the entire air carrier industry in 1938, the year the Board was established,
which is shown by the 1940 C.A.B. Annual Report 50 to have been 253.
Furthermore, the aircraft are comparable in capacity, and superior in speed, safety, and
comfort. Executive Airlines (based at Boston) alone projected 1970 traffic at 404,857
passengers (Part 298, Weight Limitation Investigation, Dkt. 21761, Executive Airlines, Exhibit
135), which is undoubtedly more than boarded by any single carrier in 1938 (1940 C.A.B.
Annual Report 39). The Board has sometimes granted exemptions for use of larger aircraft in
special situations (cf. Catalina and Alcan, Exemptions, 39 C.A.B. 851, 852 (1963)), Interstate Airmotive, Exemption, 36 C.A.B. 864, 865 (1962). Means for achieving greater stability
in this segment of the industry are now under consideration by the Congress (S. 796).
2 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 303 F.2d 395, 400 *(D.C. Cir. 1962).
3 Now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amend., 49 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.
4 C.A.B., P. R., §§ 302.1, 302.12, 302.915.
5 C.A.B., P. R., § 302.24.
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methodically in order of filing. 6 There are many reasons for this policy which
will not be considered here, but through its exercise the Board has given some
guidance to events, and applicants have usually acquiesced. As will hereinafter
be shown, the Board has tended to be more generous with awards in good
economic weather. Undoubtedly, applicants are influenced by that same weather
and are more acquisitive, competitive and inclined to seek new grarits when it
is fair. Conversely they tend to huddle together and seek mergers when it is
stormy.7
The scope of route licensing8 and merger cases9 is determined by the Board
and the issues are heard 0 and initially decided by a hearing examiner", in formal
adversary proceedings, 2 conducted in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act."8 Decisions are subject to discretionary review by the Board,' 4 which
may affirm, reverse, or remand in whole or in part,' amend and/or issue its own
decision.'
II. The Beginnings
By about the mid-1920's a number of venturesome persons were operating
airlines of sorts, most of them unrelated, making the best use they could of the
vehicles then available, which were small, slow, short range, and open cockpit.
The embryo industry was given a great boost by Congressional passage of the
Kelly Act of 1925' which spoke in terms of airmail transportation contracts to
be let to private operators. The industry was given another great boost by the
introduction into service of the fully enclosed Ford all metal monoplanes, soon
refined into the celebrated trimotor "Tin Goose" which was capable of carrying
eleven passengers, cruised at 145 miles per hour, and was followed by improved
aircraft of other manufacture.' In 1926 scheduled passenger air services geLmiles.' 9 By 1928 traffic had grown
erated about 1.2 million revenue passenger
20
to 11 million revenue passenger miles.

The potentials of the industry for commercial development received a third
6 "It is the Board and not the applicant which, in a realistic sense, controls the initiation of
licensing proceedings." Jones, Licensing of Domestic Air Transportation, 30 J. Am L. & Com.
134 (1964).
7 In recent testimony before the Senate Aviation Committee, Robert Six, President of
Continental Airlines, said the Big Four and PanAm always cry "Merge" when business gets bad.
"It is, of course, a delightful solution for them. It gets rid of the worrisome pressure from
smaller carriers which are always proposing innovation in fares or service and which have the
embarrassing habit of attaining higher aircraft utilization and lower unit costs." William V.
Henzey, Editorial Director, AnLiNES MANAGEMENT MAGAZINE, Address to National Airlines

Management Club, Mar. 2, 1971.
8 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 401, 72 Stat. 754, as amend. by 76 Stat. 143, 49 U.S.C.
1371.
9 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 408, 72 Stat. 767, as amend. by 74 Stat. 901, 49 U.S.C.
1378.
10 C.A.B. P. R. §§ 302.12, 302.13, 302.915.
11 C.A.B., P. R. § 302.27.
12 Ibid.
13 5 U.S.C. 551, et seq.
14 C.A.B., P. R. § 302.28.
15 C.A.B., P. R. § 302.36.
16 Ibid.
17 Air Mail Act of 1925. (43 Stat. 805.)
18 G. LOENiNO, TnE Am RoAu WiLL WIDEN 4 et seq.
STATisTics, Part II, tit. 15 at 23 (1969).
19 C.A.B. HA4Doox oir Anum
20 Ibid.
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boost when, in 1930, the Postmaster General's statutory base was expanded by
the Congress to include authority to require use of passenger aircraft to transport
the mail, and to extend and consolidate the existing contract routes. 2' The then
Postmaster General, Walter Folger Brown, was dissatisfied with the short-haul
characteristics of the system then evolving and which necessitated many transfers
from carrier to carrier. Accordingly, he addressed his efforts to the extension
and consolidation of routes and in so doing laid a foundation for the long-haul
system which serves this country today.
There were charges, nevertheless, whether merited or not, of disregard for
principles of competitive bidding. In February 1934, the new Postmaster General cancelled the contracts and the task of carrying the mail was assigned to
the Army. The Army proved to be ill prepared; service was unpredictable;
accidents were frequent; deaths occurred; and eventually a clamor broke out.
Accordingly, another turnabout took place and the task of carrying the
airmail was returned to the private sector. This time it was done with the utmost
care that competitive bidding principles be meticulously observed, and very
shortly all domestic airmail was contracted for anew under the quickly adopted
Air Mail Act of 1934.2 Competitive bidding indeed occurred and, as it turned
out, was so intensive that numerous contracts were let well below the cost of
services. This was too much and by 1937 the economics of the industry was in
shambles.23
Meanwhile, however, quality of aircraft had continued to improve. In
1933, the Boeing 247, ten-passenger monoplane was introduced. 4 It cruised at
155 miles per hour and had a range of about 500 miles. This was quickly
followed by the DC-225 which seated 14 passengers, cruised at about 175 miles
per hour, and could fly New York-Chicago nonstop. Then came the ten-passenger
Lockheed Electra,26 and soon the DC-3,27 the most famous of all aircraft, which
carried 21 passengers, cruised at 180 miles per hour, and had a maximum stage
length of about 1200 miles. By 1935 traffic had increased to an annual rate of
nearly 200 times the 1926 figures.28
III. The Act
In 1937, it was obvious to the Congress that the economics of the air transportation industry was nearing a state of collapse,29 and that if it was to be saved,
strong action was required. Operational capability and public demand were
21 Act of Apr. 29, 1930. (46 Stat. 260.) See Westwood and Bennett, A Footnote to the
Legislative History of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterword, 42 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 309 (1967).
22 48 Stat. 933.
23 "Competition among air carriers is being carried to an extreme, which tends to jeopardize
the financial status of the air carriers and render unsafe a transportation service appropriate to
the needs of commerce and required in the public interest, in the interests of the Postal Service,
and of the national defense." S. Rep. No. 1661, 75th Cong. 3d Sess., 2.
24

C.A.B.

HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATIsTI

s

485 (1969).

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 1939 C.A.A. ANNUAL REPoRT 51.
29 ". . . Drawing upon the anticompetitive spirit of the thirties and the condemnation of
'destructive' or 'cutthroat' competition and 'disorderly' or 'chaotic' economic development, the
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apparent, however, and offered promise of future benefits of great proportions.
Accordingly, the Congess set about writing a comprehensive regulatory statute,
modeled in part on the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.'0 The product was the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938.
The major economic provisions remain essentially unchanged today as they
appear in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended."1 Provisions for mail
pay, both in compensation for services (service mail pay) and as an aid to
development (subsidy) were carried into the Act. 2 The course of the subsequently separated subsidy component as a percentage of revenues has been generally downward, and has long since disappeared as far as the larger carriers are
concerned. It now remains primarily as a nominal, but at least temporarily
needed, contribution to the earnings of the local service carriers. 3
The new Act admonished the Board to direct attention to the development
of an air transportation system. Section 102 (then section 2) of the Act contains
the Declaration of Policy, 4 wherein it is stated:

In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this
Act, the Board shall consider the following, among other things, as being in
the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and
necessity:
'(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the
national defense; ...
In a similar vein the Declaration directed attention to the fostering of
"sound economic conditions" (subsection (b)), "The promotion of adequate,
1938 legislation was prompted in large part by the specter of insolvency and the expressed need
to restore credit to a faltering industry." Jones, Antitrust and Specific Economic Regulation: An
Introduction to Comparative Analysis, 19 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 307 (1961).
30 Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C. 301, et seq.
31 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, supra note 3.
32 In present text: Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 406. (72 Stat. 763, as amend. by 76 Stat.
145, 80 Stat. 942. 49 U.S.C. 1376).

33
34

1969 C.A.B.

ANNUAL REPORT

30.

"DECLARATION OF POLICY: THE BOARD. See. 102. In the exercise and
performance of its power and duties under this Act, the Board shall consider the following, among other things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with
the public convenience and necessity: (a) The encouragement and development of
an air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the
national defense; (b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in,
and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers; (c) The promotion of
adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices; (d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States. of the Postal Service, and of the
national defense; '(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and (f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics." Federal Aviation Act of
1958 § 102.
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economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without
unjust discrimination, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices," (subsection (c)) and "The promotion, encouragement,
and development of civil aeronautics," (subsection (f)).
There is another subsection which is the focal point for this article. Mindful
of the recent turbulent experiences pertaining to freedom of competition, the
Congress established a central theme for the Act. The theme is that of limited
competition. It was manifested in many ways, but most significantly by including
in the Declaration of Policy a measure of the extent to which competition was
to be considered as being in the public interest."' This is subsection (d) and the
language is as follows:
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service,
and of the national defense; ...
The language is directed at all activities of the Board. 6
Several persons who had contributed to the emergence of the statute were
among the first members appointed to the Board or held top positions in the new
organization." Accordingly, early decisions often made mention of the signifi35 The definition included in the draft prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee which
played a key role in the process leading to adoption was as follows: "In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this Act, the Board shall consider the public interest to
require - ...
(b) The preservation and encouragement of competition among persons operating airlines to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of air transportation; . . ."
See Westwood and Bennett, A Footnote to the Legislative History of the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938 and Afterword, 42 NoraE DAME LAWYEPR 309, 368 (1967). It will be observed that in
the definition finally adopted the words "preservation and encouragement" and "among persons
operating airlines," do not appear.
36 The Board has possibly been more restrictive in its views as to the extent of the competition to be required in some areas than in others. Price competition may be one of them. A
leading case concerning price competition is that of Trans World Air. Siesta Sleeper-Seat
Service, 27 C.A.B. 788, 794, 795 (1958). TWA, for competitive reasons, had filed a tariff
proposing to provide sleeper seats in transcontinental services at standard first-class fares. These
fares were challenged by other carriers as unjust and unreasonable. The Board struck them
down and in the course of the opinion said the following:
. . . This kind of competition - competition in giving away more luxurious seating - may suit the immediate objective of a given carrier in attempting to divert
existing traffic, but it is just the kind of destructive competition that the Act was designed to prevent.
.. Practices decided upon by carrier management can have far-reaching effects
on other carriers and on the public, and because of this '(among other reasons) Congress established the Board to regulate the airline industry - not to be a disinterested
observer - and forbid practices which, under the standards laid down by Congress,
are detrimental to the public interest....
There can be no question as to the Board's power to forbid fare practices which
are uneconomical from an industrywide standpoint. The legislative history of the Act
clearly shows that when Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, one of the
basic evils it intended to dispel was uneconomical competitive rate practices which
had produced chaos in the industry and had shaken the faith of the investing public.
Thus, the very purpose of the Act was to provide for regulation of competition between
airlines by an independent agency, not by the free forces of the market place. And in
performing its regulatory duties, since at least the first freight rate investigation in
1948, the Board has not deviated from the interpretation that the public-interest provisions of section 2 (now Sec. 102) of the Act are applicable to fare and rate
proceedings.
Cf. Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation, Dkt. 21866, Orders 71-4-48, 71-4-54, 71-4-58,
71-4-59, 71-4-60 (1971).
37 See Westwood and Bennett, History of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterword,
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cance of the central theme of the Act. Thus, in Acquisition of Western A. E. by
United A. L., it is stated:
.. . Reference to both the legislative history and to the text of the act
demonstrates the congressional intent to safeguard an industry of vital importance to the commercial and defense interests of the Nation against the
evils of unrestrained competition on the one hand, and the consequences of
monopolistic control on the other. In attaining this objective the act seeks
a state of competition among air carriers to the extent required by the sound
development of the industry....ss
Such provisions are not common in regulatory statutes. What this amounted
to was an effort to introduce some competitive vitality into conventionally mo-

nopolistic public utility concepts.3

Carriers seeking routes were required to

obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity and to meet the public convenience and necessity tests" of the Declaration of Policy." The Board was
42 NoTvn DAME LAwYER 309, 315, 327, 329 (1967). Edward P. Warner, a first Member of
the-Board had been a Member of The Federal Aviation Commission appointed pursuant to the
Air Mail Act of 1934 which submitted recommendations for legislation. Harlee Branch, the first
Vice Chairman, had, as Assistant Postmaster General, been a Member of the Interdepartmental
Drafting Committee, and Clinton M. Hester, the first Administrator, had been spokesman for
that group before the committees of Congress.
38 Acquisition of Western A. E. by United Air Lines, I C.A.A. 739, 749, 750 (1940).
39 "The Act was... premised in part on the 'natural monopoly' theory underlying conventional public utility regulation, the commercial aviation industry being analogized to other transportation and utility industries." Jones, Antitrust and Specific Economic Regulation: An Introduction to Comparative Analysis, 19 ABA ANTITRUST SEcTION 307 (1961).

40

Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
Sec. 401. (72 Stat. 754, as amend. by 76 Stat. 143, 82 Stat. 867, 49 U.S.C. 1371).
'(a) No air carrier shall engage in any air transportation unless there is in force a
certificate issued by the Board authorizing such air carrier to engage in such transportation.... (b) Application for a certificate shall be made in writing to the Board
and shall be so verified, shall be in such form and contain such information, and shall
be accompanied by such proof of service upon such interested persons, as the Board
shall by regulation require.... (c) Upon the filing of any such application, the Board
shall give due notice thereof to the public by posting a notice of such application in
the office of the secretary of the Board and to such other persons as the Board may by
regulation determine. Any interested person may file with the Board a protest or
memorandum of opposition to or in support of the issuance of a certificate. Such application shall be set for a public hearing, and the Board shall dispose of such application
as speedily as possible ...
(d) (1) The Board shall issue a certificate authorizing the
whole or any
part
of theand
transportation
covered
the application,
if it finds
the
applicant
is fit,
willing,
able to perform
suchbytransportation
properly,
and that
to conform to the provisions of this Act and the rules, regulations, and requirements of the

Board hereunder, and that such transportation is required by the public convenience
and necessity; otherwise such application shall be denied. (2) In the case of an application for a certificate to engage in temporary air transportation, the Board may issue
a certificate
authorizing
whole or any
thereofif it
forfinds
suchthat
limited
periods asismay
be
required by
the publicthe
convenience
andpart
neessity,
the applicant
fit,
willing,
to perform such transportation and to conform to the provision ofand
this able
Act properly
and the rules,
regulations, and requirements

of the Board hereunder.

(3) In the case of an application for a certificate to engage in supplemental air transportation, the Board may issue a certificate, to any applicant not holding a certificate
under paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, authorizing the whole or any part
thereof, and for such

periods, as may be requiredr
by the public convenience and neces-

sity, if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able properly to perform the transportation
covered by the application and

to conform to the provisions of this Act and
the rules, regulations, and requirements of the Board hereunder. Any certificate issued
pursuant to this paragraph shall contain such limitations as the Board shall find necessary to assure that the service rendered pursuant thereto will be limited to supplemental
atr transportation as defined in this Act.... (e) () Each certificate issued under this
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authorized to attach such reasonable terms, conditions, or limitations as the public
interest may require,4' and
to subsequently modify, suspend, or revoke under
43
designated circumstances.
The Board was forbidden, however, to restrict the right of a certificated
scheduled route carrier to add to or change schedules, equipment, accommodations, or facilities as the development of the business and the demands of the
public so required.4" On the other hand, it was given authority to require
45
adequate services.
IV. Formal Route Licensing
The First Annual Report to the Congress shows the total system to then
comprise 36,533 route miles.4" There were eighteen carriers, 47 253 aircraft,4 and
on the average about thirteen seats per aircraft. 9
The Act then contained a grandfather provision which, in addition to
directing certifications covering nine routes for which appropriations had been
made,5" authorized issuance of a route to any air carrier which made application
within 120 days upon showing that it had operated continuously from May 14,
1938, and that its services were adequate and efficient. That was the starting
point and the process of validating routes occupied a great deal of attention
in the early period. But there were many new applications,"' and although
section shall specify the terminal points and intermediate points, if any, between which
the air carrier is authorized to engage in air transportation and the service to be rendered; and there shall be attached to the exercise of the privileges granted by the
certificate, or amendment thereto, such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations as
the public interest may require.... (4) No term, condition, or limitation of a certificate shall restrict the right of an air carrier to add to or change schedules, equipment,
accommodations, and facilities for performing the authorized transportation and service
as the development of the business and the demands of the public shall require; . . .
(g) The Board upon petition or complaint or upon its own initiative, after notice and
hearings, may alter, amend, modify, or suspend any such certificate, in whole or in
part, for intentional failure to comply with any provision of this title or any order,
rule, or regulation issued hereunder or any term, condition, or limitation of such certificate: Provided, That no such certificate shall be revoked unless the holder thereof
fails to comply, within a reasonable time to be fixed by theBoard, with an order of the
Board commanding obedience to the provision, or to the order (other than an order
issued in accordance with this proviso), rule, regulation, term, condition, or limitation
found by the Board to have been violated. Any interested person may file with the
Board a protest or memorandum in support of or in opposition to the alteration,
amendment, modification, suspension, or revocation of the certificate.
41 ". .. in the light of these standards it was not the congressional intent that the air
transportation system should be 'frozen' to its present pattern. . . . It is equally apparent that
Congress intended the Authority to exercise a firm control over the expansion of . . . routes in
order to prevent the scramble ... which might occur under a 'laissez faire' policy. Congress, in
defining the problem, clearly intended to avoid the duplication of transportation facilities and
services, the wasteful competitive practices, such as the opening of nonproductive routes, and
other uneconomic results which characterized the development of other modes of transportation
prior to their governmental regulation." Northwest Air., Duluth-Twin Cities Operation, 1
C.A.A., 573, 577 (1940).
42 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 401'(e) (1), supra note 40.
43 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 4 01 (g), supra note 40.
44 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 4 0 1(e) (4), supra note 40.
45 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 404, 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. 1374.
46 1939 C.A.A. ANNUAL REPORT 19.
47 1940 C.A.A. ANNUAL REPORT 52.
48 Id. at 50.
49 Id.
50 C.A.A. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 19.
51 Id.
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processing was interrupted during the war, the system reached 58,646 route miles
in 1944.52
The young industry was deeply affected by the war. Not only were new
aircraft hard to come by but many were drawn off for military use.5 3 Demand
for new services, however, grew rapidly, and the manufacturing industry, expanded for the war effort, developed great capability for research, design, and
mass production which has well served the progress of air transportation to this
day."4 Furthermore, large numbers of people received training in the armed
services which qualified them for subsequent careers in commercial aviation.
To be found below is a table"5 which shows total number of aircraft, average
seats per aircraft, changes in route miles by percentages, aircraft revenue miles,
growth in passenger miles by percentages, passenger load factors, and rate of
return on total investment in domestic scheduled air transportation, for each
year from the close of the war through 1969. Examination of the table seems to
indicate a relationship between capacity and/or frequency and/or route increases

52
53

1944 C.A.B. ANNUAL

REPORT 1.
1968 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 104.

54 Id.
55

Calendar

Selected Statistics for the Domestic Operations of the
Passenger/Cargo Certificated Route Air Carriers:
No. of

Year

Aircrafti

Average
seats

1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

299
432
708
895
1,016
1,045
1,170
1,207
1,386
1,387
1,423
1,448
1,542
1,735
1,801
1,874
1,881
2,034
1,948
1,903
1,894
1,971
2,082
2,266
2,406
2,610

19.1
19.7
25.3
29.9
32.4
34.7
37.1
39.1
42.2
45.6
49.6
51.5
52.1
53.7
55.5
58.7
65.4
72.9
79.4
83.4
86.1
89.2
91.2
94.4
100.8
112.2

Percent
increase

Plane
miles

routes2

15.8
7.2
37.3
40.5
7.3
5.8
11.0
0.1
2.2
1.8
1.0
9.4
10.2
0.6
4.5
5.9
9.3
7.7
2.0
-1.4
0.3
0.1
-0.9
9.8
3.5
25.0

138,630
208,914
309,558
324,660
342,403
358,079
382,837
426,363
480,924
539,820
565,358
639,973
708,430
808,649
794,213
851,575
829,483
802,382
833,304
896,722
968,229
1,098,916
1,189,479
1,473,414
1,727,469
1,662,883

Percent
growth
passenger
miles

33.3
54.4
76.9
2.7
-1.8
12.9
18.6
31.9
18.6
17.8
13.6
18.2
12.8
13.3
0.0
15.5
4.3
1.7
8.2
14.4
14.8
i7.5
16.8
24.6
15.9
9.3

Passenger

Rate

load

Of

factor

return

89.4
88.2
78.7
65.2
57.6
57.8
61.2
67.8
65.5
63.4
62.4
63.3
63.3
60.8
59.4
60.5
58.5
55.4
52.6
53.2
54.8
54.7
57.9
56.5
52.4
49.9

N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
-4.70
2.53
5.21
11.43
13.56
13.56
11.17
10.44
11.44
9.36
4.46
6.25
6.99
2.92
1.24
4.26
4.16
9.44
11.75
10.28
8.213
4.933
3.883

I Includes fleets of all certified route air carriers
2 Domestic trunk and Local Service carriers only.
3
Rate of return on adjusted investment.
Total aircraft fleet size for the years 1944 through 1956 is at
June 30, the year 1957 at May 15, and the year 1959 at Mar. 30
Compiled from C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORTS, C.A.B. HANDBOOK
oF AIm. STAT., C.A.B. FoRMs 41 and internal reports.
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on the one hand, and profitability on the other.5" The table likewise seems to
show a relationship to the recession of 1960-61, and perhaps to those of 1957-58,
and 1966-67. However, the economic course of the industry was constant
through the recession of 1953-54.
Following the war and freed from its restrictions the number and dimensions
of aircraft grew rapidly. The Board renewed attention to the route system and,
as shown by the table, in 1946 increased it by 37.3 percent and in 1947 by 40.5
percent. In 1948 the number of aircraft reached 1,016 and average capacity
32.4 seats. Four engines, pressurized cabins, and the nose wheel were becoming
the norm."7
No longer supported by the stimulation of the war effort, traffic did not
respond at first. In 1948 the rate of growth fell to a negative 1.8 percent and the
industry rate of return amounted to but 2.53 percent. But in the next year,

responsive to improved services, traffic began a course of growth which has continued through most years since. That fact, undoubtedly aided by more conservative policies in system and fleet expansions, and soon stimulated by the
traffic demands connected with the Korean War, returned the industry to
profitability.
In the initial route structures the number of communities eligible for services
was limited and the routes were restricted and situated at random. The grants of

1946 and 1947 were much needed but a great deal of realignment and combination of route segments, including authority to overfly junction points, remained to be done.5" As aircraft increased in capacity and range and traffic
56 There are, of course, many other factors which affect profitability, some very directly,
such as fare levels and structure, airport charges, congestion, accelerating capital requirements,
tight money, and hijacking.
Changes in route miles as reflected in the table show the final results of cases docketed and
processed by the Board sometime earlier. It should also be noted that there is a considerable
time interval between a manufacturer's planning stage and the availability of new aircraft, and
likewise a respectable interval between a carrier's decision to acquire new type aircraft and their
actual delivery.
57 1968 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 105.
58 In the early 1940's the Board turned attention to smaller communities not located along
the existing routes of what have become known as trunk carriers. The plan put into effect was
that of a system of feeder airlines. It was contemplated that routes be established between the
stronger communities of a feeder area, and that intermediate communities be served on each
flight between terminals. Thus, it would be possible to have access to points where trunk
services would be available.
The Board was aware that subsidy would be required for some time, and the early cases
forecast commercial revenues on the order of but 20 to 25 percent of operating expenses. Section
406 of the Act authorizes payments to carriers engaged in transporting the mail. There are two
components, (1) payment for services, (2) subsidy, which requires a finding of need to supplement other revenues.
In 1944 the advent of any air services was welcomed with joy. But there came a time when
the small city businessman began to observe that his big city competitor could make a considerable journey, transact business, and return home the same day. This the small city businessman
could not do. In order to accommodate him and for other reasons, including reduction in subsidy, the Board embarked on a policy similar to that it was following in extending the routes
and eliminating the restrictions of the trunks.
From humble beginnings these carriers have grown strongly, provide very good services,
and, although their proportion of total traffic remains small, in 1969 each of the present nine
boarded more passengers than the entire industry did in 1938. Proportion of commercial revenues increased to 93 percent of operating expenses.
Among the cases contributing to the growth of this class of carriers have been: Local,
Feeder, and Pick-Up Air Service, 6 C.A.B. 1 (1944); Rocky Mountain States Air Service, 6
C.A.B. 695 (1946); Seven States Area Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 680 (1958), 29 C.A.B. 102
(1959); Ozark Airlines Route Realignment Investigation, Dkt. 16606 (1969); Southern Air-
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grew, the advantages of the long-haul single-carrier, a single plane, and of nonstop services, and of the thrust to quality and efficiency provided by competition,
became more and more apparent. Consequently when public demand was most
evident, the process of revision and expansion moved forward, albeit at a varying
pace. 9 Peaks in the rate of new grants were reached in 1950, 1956, 1960, and
1969.
During the late 1940's the DC-4's began to be supplemented by the DC-6's,"
and in the early 1950's by the DC-6B's. 61 In 1957 and 1958 the DC-7's and
Lockheed L-1649A's were introduced.6 2 These aircraft could fly transcontinentally nonstop. They were closely followed by the faster turbo-prop Lockheed
Electras,6" and soon thereafter by the still faster turbo jets,"4 most of them manufactured by Boeing or Douglas, which, as they progressed from model to model
became larger and larger. The growth in average number of seats per aircraft
in 1960 and 1961, and quite recently'in 1969, was startling. -By 1968 a single aircraft, a stretched DC-8, was capable of producing more annual available seat
miles than the entire industry did thirty years earlier. 5 Moreover, the total
number of aircraft' had multiplied by ten.
The Board has sometimes been criticized for inconsistency. 6 Undoubtedly
some of this is deserved. It is also undoubtedly true in some areas of Board
responsibility that rigid adherence through thick and thin to guidelines contrived
at any particular point in time may include elements of danger, unless founded
upon the most thorough and objective analysis of industry experience, supported
by prophetic vision, and fortified by much good luck. As shown in the accompanying chartr the economic course of the industry is not constant. It follows
crests and valleys. The first crest is identifiable with the war years When traffic
was heavy in comparison to the facilities available. Thereafter the course
descended to a low in 1947, thence upward t6 another crest in 1950, which
ways, Inc., Route Realignment Investigation, Dkt. 18610 (1969) ; Central Route 81 Case, Dkt.
16196 (1969); Allegheny Airlines Route 97 Investigation, Dkt. 17436 (1969).
There is another very small class of carriers certified to perform scheduled services by
helicopter in and about certain large cities. Their economic fortunes have not been good and
where services are being performed, they are presently nominal. Orders E-20214, E-22963, and

E-23714.

59 Among the conspicuous contributors have been: The Denver Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 1178
(1955); New York-Chicago Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 973 (1955); New York-Chicago Service
(Northwest Restriction), 23 C.A.B. 943 '(1956); Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 23 C.A.B.
42 (1956); New York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956); Florida-Texas Service Case, 24
C.A.B. 308 (1956): Great Lakes-Southeast Service Case, 28 C.A.B. 897 (1959); St. LouisSoutheast Service Case, 32 C.A.B. 43 (1960); Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 33

C.A.B. 701 (1961); Gulf States-Midwest Points Service Investigation, Dkt. 17726 '(1969);

Reopened Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service Investigation, Dkt. 15459 (1969); Southern
Tier Competitive Nonstop Investigation, Dkt. 18257 (1969); Transpacific Route Investigation
Case, Dkt. 16242 (1969) (in which several new routes between the Mainland and Hawaii were
awarded).
60 1948 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 60.
61 1952 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 61.
62 1958 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 50.
63 1959 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 58.

64
65

1960 C.A.B.
1968 C.A.B.

66.
REPORT 103.

ANNUAL REPORT
ANNUAL

66 "There would seem to be but three readings of Sec. 2(d) (now See. 102(d) Federal
Aviation Act), in any way meriting consideration; as we shall see, the Board, at various times,
has employed them all, and perhaps others as well.... ." H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES - THE NE D FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 77 (1962).

67 Supra note 55.
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continued through 1956. Following that the course was generally downward
to a low in 1961, then upward to the crest of 1964 which lasted through 1966.
Hopefully we are now beginning to recover from the third and deepest downward turn.6" It seems worthwhile to take a brief look at some of the cases decided
in the course of the expansion program, and at various stages of the economic
ups and downs.
In the early case of Eastern A. L. et al., Washington Service,69 decided in
1943, when load factors had neared an all-time high and wherein routes were
added between Washington and the cities of St. Louis, Toledo, and Dayton,
the Board in optimistic tone said this:
The end of the present world conflict should see unprecedented ...
increase in volume of both passengers and property carried by air. With
this increase ... we do not believe that the intervenors are justified in their
fears that the authorization of the proposed routes will jeopardize the
financial stability of existing carriers....
Thus, while the proposed routes will probably divert some revenues
... at the inception of the service, we think that any adverse effects will be
temporary only and will be offset by the general increase in air travel and
other factors discussed hereinbefore....
In 1944, in the same economic climate, the Board decided Colonial Air.
et al., Atlantic Seaboard Op.,"0 awarding new routes between Jacksonville and
New York and in the course of its opinion, among other things, said:
... Section 2 .

.

. directs the Board . . . to consider, among other things,

"competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an
air transportation system .... " This provision . . . leaves to the discretion
of the Board the determination of whether competition in a particular area
is necessary to assure the sound development of an appropriate... system.
In exercising this discretion it is the Board's duty to protect the . . . industry
against the evils of unrestrained competition on the one hand, and the
adverse consequences of monopolistic control on the other.
It is generally recognized that . . . regulation alone cannot be relied

upon to take the place of the stimulus which competition provides in the
advancement of techniques and service.... Competition invites comparison
as to equipment, cost, personnel, organization, methods of operation, solicitation and handling of traffic, and the like, all of which tend to insure the
development of an air transportation system ....

That the ...

system...

has reached its present position of preeminence is in large part due to the
competitive spirit which has existed throughout its development. The continued maintenance of that position as well as the further development of
the industry demands the encouragement of free initiative and enterprise
subject only to the condition that the competitive services shall not be
wasteful.
68 "Of the eleven domestic trunklines plus Pan American, only five operated profitably in
1970." Address of Floyd D. Hall, Chief Executive Officer, Eastern Airlines, Aviation/Space
Writers Assoc., New York City, Feb. 24, 1971.
69 Eastern Air Lines, Washington Service, 4 C.A.B. 325, 350 (1943).
70 Colonial Air Lines, Atlantic Seaboard Operations, 4 C.A.B. 552, 554, 555 (1944).

[Vol. 47:32]

ROLE OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

...
[T]here is a strong, although not conclusive, presumption in favor
of competition on any route which offers sufficient traffic to support competing services without unreasonable increase of total operating cost....

In the two years following the Colonial decision the number of aircraft in
service increased by 150 percent, capacity by 20 percent, route miles by nearly
45 percent, plane miles by over 150 percent, and although traffic increased by
more than 130 percent, load factors fell and by 1947 the rate of return was well
into the red. In denying a new competitive San Francisco-Seattle route in the
West Coast Case, 1 decided in 1946, the Board spoke in a new tone:
...
It would be most ill-advised, we believe, in the face of the many
uncertainties of the present period of transition, to expose a carrier, whose
financial strength is showing a marked tendency to decline, to additional
impairment in the form of competition by a new service for which the
record shows no public need and which, if authorized, will further weaken
the one carrier without strengthening the other.

The Board frequently considers applications for new services in which the
potential revenues are substantially insufficient to cover costs. Although certain
to be favored by the communities immediately affected, such a grant may not
be consistent with the public interest. Thus, if required to operate in a market
which will not carry its own weight, a carrier must subsidize the services from
other markets. Accordingly, there will be an upward pressure on fares in those
markets. Furthermore, in many cases the new services will cause a diversion of
revenues from competing carriers, with a resultant upward pressure on fares over
their routes. As the air transportation system continued to expand and new
grants became more and more competitive, such considerations tended to draw
increased attention.
By 1950, apparently influenced by burgeoning traffic and greater restraint
in route grants and in capacity increases, load factors began to rise and the
industry entered upon an unparalleled seven-year period of profitability. But in
1951 the Board had not yet forgotten the recent experience when, in denying
applications in the Southern Service to the West Case,72 it said the following:
It is important to keep in mind the fact that it is not necessary to
establish a competitive service upon every segment of our air transportation
system to assure the benefits of competition. The Congress recognized this
truth when it directed the Board to adhere to a policy of competition only
"to the extent necessary to assure the sound development" of the air transportation system....

A business, to be sound, must be able to weather the economic
storms as well as avail itself of the opportunities of the prosperous periods.
It would be short-sighted indeed were we to organize our air transport route
system on the assumlition that conditions ... will always be favorable. We
71
72

West Coast Case, 6 C.A.B. 961, 972 (1946)_
Southern Service to the West Case, 12 C.A.B. 518, 533, 534 (1951).
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know from the experience of the last 4 years that air transportation can
pass with surprising abruptness from relatively sound conditions to conditions of grave crisis, even when the circumstances of the general economy
are favorable. In formulating policies and reaching decisions . . . we take
the chance of committing fatal error if we close our eyes to the warning
lessons of this experience.
• . . Our aim and that of the carriers must always be to provide the
public with the benefits of safe and modem air transportation at the lowest
rates and fares that can be economically provided. The most effective means
of achieving this objective is the development of an air route pattern which
will enable the individual carriers to enjoy the highest load factors. The
creation of uneconomic, duplicating services will not encourage the development of such load factors.
By 1955, however, memories of "the last four years" had dimmed and,
in authorizing new services in the Southwest-Northeast Service Case7" the Board
returned to its initial optimism and stated:
• . . Fundamental to the Act is the provision that the Board shall
regard as in the public interest "Competition to the extent necessary to
assure the sound development of an air transportation system properly
adapted to. . ." our relevant factors ... the Board has ... authorized...
along with the other relevant factors . . . the Board has . . . authorized...
expansion . . . in such a manner as to bring more and more competitive

service to more and more communities.... the Board has not been guided
by the negative concept of determining first whether the existing services met
minimum standards of legal adequacy. Rather the Board has been influenced, in accordance with its statutory mandate, by the concept that
competitive service holds the greatest prospect for vigorous development of
our national air transport system with the fullest improvements in service
and technological developments....
In 1956 the Board issued the first in a series of opinions pertaining to the
fortunes of Northeast Airlines. Four will here receive attention. They chance to
coincide with two hills and two valleys on the industry's development chart.
In that year, 1956, the Board added a third carrier in the East Coast-Florida
market, and Northeast Airlines, regarded as in need of strengthening, was selected
and granted a temporary certificate. In the preceding five-year period traffic had
more than tripled, was estimated to reach three million in the year of decision,
and thereafter to grow at an annual rate of 15 percent. The Board said:
. . . Moreover, as we have on a number .of occasions pointed out,
the Congress in adopting the Civil Aeronautics Act, clearly considered
competition to hold the greatest prospect for vigorous development of our
national air route system with the fullest improvements in service and
technological developments.

....

74

Again events did not turn out as forecast. Industry load factors fell and by
1961 rate of return had dropped to 1 percent. In this changed climate the Board
73 Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 22 O.A.B. 52, 60 (1955).
74 New York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94, 99 (1956).
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addressed the question of renewing Northeast's certificate. Its 1963 opinion
included the following:
...the Board... anticipated that the diversionary impact... would
be substantially offset by future traffic growth. The growth has not
occurred....

The unsuccessful nature of Northeast's operations to date, the lack
of any substantial evidence that it will become successful in the future, the
failure of the expected east coast-Florida traffic growth to materialize, the
fact that Eastern and National can meet the present needs of the market,
and the opportunity:.. to aid in the rehabilitation of Eastern, persuade us
that the public convenience and necessity do not require the present authorr....75
ization of a third ...
Northeast appealed to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit which
set aside the order and remanded the case. The Board thereafter issued a second
opinion. 7 The First Circuit again remanded7 8 whereupon the Board determined
to reopen the decision for a complete review, and returned the case to the examiner.
Meanwhile the circumstances of the industry again improved, traffic grew,
load factors grew, rate of return reached 12 percent, and the air transportation
system was proceeding along its third crest. The examiner's decision, which
became the final decision of the Board, was issued on December 8, 1966, and in
it he said:
...there is now fully established a vindication of the conclusions reached
in 1956.... The... factors that dictated ... denial of... renewal, viz.,
the failure of the traffic to develop as forecast.., the drastically deteriorated
financial position of Northeast . . . and the uncertain status of Eastern,
do not now persist. On the contrary, there is now established an overall
picture conforming to that which was visualized .... 79
The fourth in this series of opinions was issued by a Board examiner in 1970
in the Northwest-Northeast Merger Case. It was another time of trouble. In a
decision recommending approval of the merger the examiner spoke of Northeast's
situation in part as follows:
Its operations as a whole have been consistently unprofitable; in fact,
except for 1966 when the carrier showed a slight profit, Northeast has had
an unbroken history of operating losses over the past ten years .... 8 0
...

75 New York-Florida Renewal Case, 38 C.A.B. 680, 690 (1963).
76 Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 331 F.2d 579 *(1964).

77 New York-Florida Renewal Case, 41 C.A.B. 404 (1964).
78

Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 345 F.2d 484 (1965).

79 Reopened New York-Florida Renewal Case, I.D. of Examiner William J. Madden, Dkt.

12285 68, 69 (Nov. 1966).
80 Northwest-Northeast Merger Case, Rec. D of Examiner Robert L. Park, Dkt. 21819

(Aug. 1970). The Board's decision affirming in pertinent part issued December 31, 1970.
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Thus it appears that the Board has, over the years, been optimistic in tone,
and relaxed on the question of need for restraint in competition, when the circumstances of the industry are good, but, on the contrary, when the industry falls
on less fortunate days, the tone changes and need for restraint on competition
gains emphasis. It has been said that the Board, by increases in route grants in
times of good industry earnings, has often contributed to an economic downturn.
If this is true it may also be said that the Board, by exercising caution in times of
poor industry earnings, has often contributed to an upturn.
By 1970 the total domestic system operated by fixed-wing air carriers had
been expanded to 404,250 route miles or more than eleven times its 1938 proportions, albeit 89.53 percent of the traffic now moved in competitive markets.8 '
A total of 698 communities received service. There were thirty-four carriers.8 2
Several of the original eighteen had merged, but many new ones, particularly of
the class known as local service or regional carriers, had been added to the
system. Total number of aircraft had increased by about ten times, capacity per
aircraft by about ten times, speed by nearly four times, range by three times, and
passenger miles by 175 times. Instead of the DC-3's, the new planes in contemplation were enormous wide-bodied jets by Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed.
Quite remarkably, fares remained at about the same level.8" Thus, in view of
the extraordinary improvements in convenience and efficiency, air transportation
is one of the very best bargains to be had.
V. Mergers
From the standpoint of convenience to a traveler, be that traveler a person
or a box, long distance transportation, with very few exceptions, is performed
most efficiently by a single carrier.8 4 Accordingly, there is a constant interest
on the part of the public, the air carriers, and the Board, in facilitating the
potentials for such services.
Sometimes this can best be accomplished by mergers. A merger is likely to
result in lower costs and thus be conducive to lower fares. In contrast, extending
routes by new grants of authority will ordinarily not result in so great a number
of through services as do combinations of existing systems, and may, in the present
advanced state of route development, result in more carriers on some segments
than the markets can readily absorb, thereby provoking an upward thrust on
fares.
Carriers seem most likely to be attracted to mergers when earnings are
down and cost savings urgent. Thus ten domestic mergers have been approved

81 1970 C.A.B. COMPETITION STUDIES, tit. 5.
82 1970 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 106.
83 Average yield per passenger mile of the domestic trunks in 1938 was 5.50 cents. In 1970
it was 5.78 cents. 1970 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 114.
84 Pacific Northwest-Southwest Service Investigation, Dkt. 15459, I.D. Examiner Ross I.
Newmann (June 1966); Southern Transcontinental Service Case, 33 G.A.B. 701, 878, 879
(1961); Erie-Detroit Service Case, 24 C.A.B. 523,556 (1956); Delta-Chicago and Southern
Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647, 690 (1952); Great Lakes Area Case, 8 C.A.B. 360, 375 (1947);
Delta Air Lines Service to Atlanta and Birmingham, 2 C.A.B. 447, 479 (1941).

[Vol. 47:32]

ROLE OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

since the beginning of the present downturn,"5 four more are pending, 6 and
others appear on the horizon, albeit not all mergers approved subject to certain
conditions have been consummated. 7 Nevertheless, carriers are wary of mergers
for many reasons, including the uncertainties that persist among employees and in
the business community during the substantial periods required for processing."8
They are also wary because of the formidability of the proceedings. The

applicable statutory provision is Section 408.9 That section, in addition to
forbidding approval where found to transgress the public interest, also forbids
it under the terms of a proviso directed at any merger which creates a monopoly
85 American Airlines and Trans Caribbean Airways, Dkt. 21828, Order 70-12-161; Northwest-Northeast Merger Agreement, Dkt. 21819, Orders 70-12-162 and 163; Allegheny-Lake
Central Merger-Case, Dkt. 19151, Order E-26967; Bonanza-Pacific West Coast Merger Case,
Dkt. 18996, Orders E-26625 and 26626; Frontier Airlines, Inc.-Central Airlines, Inc. Merger,
Dkt. 18517, Order E-25626; Alaska-Alaska Coastal Merger Case, Dkt. 18408, Orders E-26548
and 26549; Northern Consolidated-Wien Alaska Merger, Dkt. 18305, Orders E-26349 and
26350; Alaska-Cordova Merger Case, Dkt. 18293, Order E-26083; Western-Pacific Northern
Merger, Dkt. 17951, Order E-25240; Eastern-Mackey Merger Case, Dkt. 16367, Orders E-24427
and 24428.
86 Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc.-Eastern Airlines, Inc. Acquisition Case, Dkt. 22690;
American-Western Merger Agreement, Dkt. 22916; Delta Air Lines, Inc.-Northeast Airlines,
Inc., Dkt. 23315; Allegheny Airlines, Inc. and Mohawk Airlines, Inc., Dkt. 23371.
87 Northwest-Northeast Merger Agreement, Dkt. 21819.
88

".

.

., as a general premise, mergers are disruptive of effort, morale, and service and

should be entered rarely and only on an affirmative basis, i.e., where the two companies involved
can combine their strengths to improve their service, balance sheets and personal opportunities,
and increase their competitive position. Mergers should not be defensive in a public service industry. They are not a panacea to be turned to when -the growth rate softens." William V.
Henzey, Editorial Dir., AIRLINE MANAGEMENT MAG., Address to National Airlines Management
Club, Mar. 2, 1971, 7.
89 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 408. In pertinent part this section is as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful unless approved by order of the Board as provided in this
section -"(1)
For two or more air carriers, or for any air carrier and any other common carrier or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to consolidate
or merge their properties, or any part thereof, into one person for the ownership,
management, or operation of the properties theretofore in separate ownerships; (2)
For any air carrier, any person controlling an air carrier, any other common carrier,
or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to purchase, lease, or contract to operate the properties, or any substantial part thereof, of any air carrier; (3)
For any air carrier of person controlling an air carrier to purchase, lease, or contract
to operate the properties, or any 'substantial part, thereof, of any person engaged in
any phase of aeronautics otherwise than as an air carrier; (4) For any foreign air
carrier or person controlling a foreign air carrier to acquire control, in any manner
whatsoever, of any citizen of the United States engaged in any phase of aeronautics;
(5) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any other common carrier,
any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, or any other person to acquire
control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever: Provided, That the Board may
by order exempt any such acquisition of a noncertificated air carrier from this requirement to the extent and for such periods as may be in the public interest; (6) For any
air carrier or person controlling an air carrier to acquire control, in any manner whatsoever, of any person engaged in any phase of aeronautics otherwise than as an air
carrier; or (7) For any person to continue to maintain any relationship established in
violation of any of the foregoing subdivisions of this subsection. POWER OF BOARD
(b) Any person seeking approval of a consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, specified in subsection '(a) of this section,
shall present an application to the Board, and thereupon the Board shall notify the
persons involved in the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or
acquisition of control, and other persons known to have a substantial interest in the
proceeding of the time and place of a public hearing. Unless, after such hearing, the
Board finds that the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or
acquisition of control will not be consistent with the public interest or that the conditions of this section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order approve such consolidation,
merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, upon such terms
and conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and with such modifications
as it may prescribe: Provided, That the Board shall not approve any consolidation,
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and thereby restrains competition. Although the Board has approved many
mergers and rejected others, it has generally predicated its decisions on the public
interest."0 Nevertheless, the terms of the proviso must be coped with and more
will hereinafter be said concerning it. The public interest has been regarded as
influenced by another section of the statute (Section 414) which exempts any
person affected by any order made under Section 408 from the operations of the
antitrust laws." This section grants similar exemptions to persons affected by
orders made under Section 412 pertaining to intercarrier and other agreements. 2
For this and other reasons many cases arising under Section 412 are related to
the line of decision in cases arising under Section 408. The public interest tests
of Section 102 apply to both sections. There is another section which should 'be
here noted (411) which deals with deceptive practices and unfair methokds of
competition.93
In Pan American-Matson-Inter-IslandContract,a Section 412 case decided
in 1942 with the continued participation of persons associated with the drafting
of the statute, appears language similar to that of the earoy route cases. The
Board quoted from Acquisition of Western Air, supra, a.merger case, and stated
in part as follows:
The Board has previously pointed out that the term "public interest"
merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control which would
result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or
jeopardize another air carrier not a party to the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease,
operating contract, or acquisition of control: ....
90 American Airlines, Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, 7 C.A.B. 365 (1946); Acquisition of Western A.E. by United Airlines, 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940) ; See also Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. C.A.B. 303 F.2d 395 (1962); The United-Capital Merger Case, supra (wherein monopoly
and antitrust considerations are discussed solely in connection with the proviso).
91 Section 414, provides:
Any person affected by any order under Section 408, 409, or 412 of this Act shall
be, and is hereby relieved from the operations of the "antitrust laws" . . . and all
other restraints or prohibitions made by, or imposed under, authority of law. insofar
as may be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or
required by such order. There is a related provision, Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. 18. Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by the Civil Aeronautics Board . . under any
statutory provision vesting such power in such... Board.
92 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 412:
(a) Every air carrier shall file with the Board a true copy, or, if oral, a true and
complete memorandum, of every contract or agreement (whether enforceable by provisions for liquidated damages, penalties, bonds or otherwise) affecting air transportation and in force on the effective date of this section or hereafter entered into, or
any modification or cancellation thereof, between such air carrier and any other air
carrier, foreign air carrier, or other carrier for pooling or apportioning earnings, losses,
traffic, service, or equipment, or relating to the establishment of transportation rates,
fares, charges, or classifications, or for preserving and improving safety, economy, and
efficiency of operation, or for controlling, regulating, preventing, or otherwise eliminating destructive, oppressive, or wasteful competition, or for regulating stops,
schedules, and character of service, or for other cooperative working arrangements.
...
(b) The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement, whether
or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be adverse to the public interest, or in
violation of this Act, and shall by order approve any such contract or agreement, or
any modification or cancellation thereof, that it does not find to be adverse to the
public interest, or in violation of this Act; ...
93 Section 411 authorizes the Board, if it considers such action to be in the public interest,
to investigate and determine whether any air carrier, or ticket agent, has, or is, engaged in
unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition. The Board is required to support such a determination by cease and desist action and a violation may be brought before the
courts.
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as used in the Act "is not a mere general reference to public welfare, but has
a direct relation to fixed statutory objectives." Thus, section 2 (now 102)
of the Act directs the Board to consider certain specific objectives as being
in the public interest....
The Board did not begin its line of decision giving emphasis to the antitrust
laws until some years thereafter, but when it did the doctrine then announced
was destined to fame, and to be uncritically followed in many cases. This was
the "Local Cartage" doctrine. It emerged in the field of air cargo.
In the early years, as has been shown, the most sought after source of
revenue was that derived from the transportation of mail. At the time of the
passage of the Act this constituted 37 percent of overall receipts.9" Thereafter it
dwindled, not in gross amount but as a percentage of revenues, and before the
end of the first ten-year period had fallen below 8 percent of total receipts. 8
The present figure is on the order of 2.9 percent.97 Mail's early status as a
percentage participant has been in substantial part replaced by that of air freight.
The first Board Annual Report in which freight is identifiable as a separate
statistical item is that for 1946, where a year's freight traffic was listed at a little
less than 5Y million ton-miles. 5 By 1948 the Board had begun to show a marked
interest in this category and that year's report99 stated:
The largest growth . . . occurred in the carriage of cargo, and the
special problems presented... have assumed increasing importance....
...
In 1941 ... cargo ton-miles came to less than 4 percent of passenger ton-miles; in 1945, the proportion reached 7 percent. In 1946 and
1947, respectively, the percentage . . . rose to approximately 10 and 20
percent, and it is probable that the proportion will reach 30 percent for
1948.

The Board was mistaken and air cargo hasn't yet reached 30 percent,100 but,
paced by the enormous growth in passenger traffic, it has attained a volume
several hundred times that first reported."' Indeed there are three route carriers
performing domestic services whose authority is limited to cargo.10 2
The value of air to cargo is speed, which is lost if pickup and delivery are
not prompt. The economics are delicate for loads include many small separately
originated and separately destined shipments.
In 1947, a number of air carriers, with Board approval, jointly established
a cartage agent, Air Cargo, Inc., to perform pickup and delivery services. 0 3 A
little later they submitted a further agreement which included a provision not to
94 Pan American-Matson-Inter-Island Contract, 3 C.A.B. 540, 545 (1942).
95 1948 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 58.
96 Id.
97 C.A.B. Am CARRmR FINAL STATIsTIcs (1969).
98 1946 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 38.
99 1948 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 17.
100 The present figure is on the order of 16.3 percent. 1970 C.A.B. ANNUAL REPORT 96.
101 In fiscal year 1970 the figure was 1,236,704,000 ton miles. Id. at 95.
102 Airlift International, Flying Tiger Lines, Seaboard World Airways.
103 C.A.B. Agreement 1041 '(Dec. 31, 1947). Air Cargo, Inc. Agreement and Petitions, 9
C.A.B. 468 (1948).
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advance cartage charges to independent truckers in some markets. Reasons given
were-savings in clerical and accounting expenses, elimination of improper or
illegal practices by the independent truckers, and improvement of the carriers'
own pickup and delivery services. This was the Local Cartage Agreement Case..
and reached decision in 1952. In denying approval the Board concluded as
follows:
Where an agreement has among its significant aspects elements which
are plainly repugnant to established antitrust principles, approval should not
be granted unless there is a clear showing that the agreement is required by
a serious transportation need, or in order to secure important public
benefits.
...

This proposition, which appears to conflict with the statutory "Declaration
of Policy,"'0 5 for "unless" and "to the extent necessary" are certainly not the
same things, was reached without citation of authority.'0 6 No mention was made
of the Declaration of Policy. The reasoning was wrapped up in two sentences:
. . .The approval of an agreement under section 412 exempts the agreement from the operation of the antitrust laws by virtue of section 414. While
this exemption demonstrates the Board's power to approve agreements which
otherwise would violate the antitrust laws, it also imposes upon the Board,
in determining the effect on the public interest of agreements for which
approval is sought, the duty 1to7 evaluate such agreements in the light of
antitrust policy and principles.
Separated from the conclusion, these two sentences find some support in
McLean Trucking Co. v. U. S.' °8 which had been previously cited in Section 412
cases for the proposition that the antitrust laws were to be taken into account. 0 9
McLean was a case involving the merger of seven interstate motor carriers approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to the authority of
Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act." 0 The lower court affirmed and the
Supreme Court affirmed. Subsection 5 (11 ) of the Act exempts approved transactions from the antitrust laws in similar fashion to Section 414 of the Federal
Aviation Act, and, the National Transportation Policy which governs the
Commission,"' is in many respects similar to the Declaration of Policy which
governs the Board. But unlike the Federal Aviation Act, it includes no definition
of the extent to which competition is to be taken into account in evaluating the
public interest."'
104 Local Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.A.B. 850, 853 (1952).
105 Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 102 (d).
106 "... any effort to delineate CAB policy is fraught with danger, simply because the Board
is noted for its propensity to alter its attitude frequently and for its ability to obscure the grounds
for its action.... ." Barber, Airline Mergers, Monopoly and the CAB, 28 J. AiR. L. & Com. 209
(1962).
107 Local Cartage Agreement Case, 15 C.A.B. 850, 852, 853 (1952).
108 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
109 Air Cargo, Inc., Agreements and Petitions, 9 C.A.B. 468, 470 (1948) ; Air Freight Tariff
Agreement Case, 14 C.A.B. 424, 425 '(1951).
110 54 Stat. 898, 905, 49 U.S.C. 5.
111 54 Stat. 898, 49 U.S.C. 1.
112 If support is to be found in McLean for the Cartage doctrine it would seem necessary to
locate it in language of the opinion excerpted as follows:
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It is clear that Justice Douglas, who dissented, did not regard McLean as
supporting such a conclusion as that subsequently announced in the Cartage case

for he, among other things, said:
I agree that the Commission is not to measure motor vehicle
consolidations by the standards of the anti-trust acts.... But I think a
proper construction of the Act requires the Commission to give greater
weight to the principles of competition than it apparently has done here.
....
The occasions for the exercise of the administrative authority to
grant exemptions from the anti-trust laws should be closely confined to
those where the transportation need is clear.113
Thus to the extent that the Cartage doctrine is connected with McLean it
appears to emanate from the dissent rather than the decision." 4 Any support
in either is subject to the infirmity of the difference in the statutes."" Pertinent
to the evaluation of such differences is the following from the court's opinion
in McLean:
•

. .

in executing those policies the Commission may be faced with

overlapping and at times inconsistent policies embodied in other legislation
enacted at different times and with different problems in view. When this
is true, it cannot, without more, ignore the latter. The precise adjustments
which it must make, however, will vary from instance to instance depending
on the extent to which Congress indicates a desire to have those policies
leavened or implemented in the enforcement of the various specific provisions of the legislation
with which the Commission is primarily and
6
directly concerned."

...the Commission is not to measure proposals ...
by the standards of the anti,trust laws. Congress . . . presumably took into account the fact that the business
affected is subject to strict regulation.... Congress .. . neither has made the ...
laws wholly inapplicable . .. nor has authorized the Commission ... to ignore this
policy. Congress recognized that ... consolidating.. . would result in some dimunition of competition and might result in the creation of monopolies. To prevent the
latter effect and to make certain that the former was permitted only where appropriate to further the national transportation policy, it placed in the Commission power
to control such developments.... The fact that the carriers... may obtain immunity
from prosecution ... in no sense relieves the.., duty, as an administrative matter, to
consider the effect... on competitors and on the general competitive situation in the
industry in the light of the objectives of the national transportation policy. (Emphasis
supplied.) In short, the Commission must estimate the scope and appraise the effects
of the curtailment of competition.., and consider them along with the advantages. of
improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc., to determine whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating the over-all transportation policy. (Emphasis supplied.)
McLean Trucking v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 85-87 (1944).
113 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944), (Douglas, J., dissenting at
92-94).
114 See Note, Merger in the Domestic Air TransportIndustry, 48 VX. L. REv. 1437 (1962)X
115 See Hale and Hale, Competition or Control: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated
Industries, 111 U. PA. L. Rmv. 46 (1962), where the authors state:
A vital difference between air and motor carriage, however, does exist in the
Civil Aeronautics Board's authority over service and rates. The CAB can compel the
rendering of services, profitable or otherwise, and has power to fix maximum as well as
minimum rates. As a consequence, there is no room for application of the antitrust
laws to the airlines. Enforcement of such legislation would merely impede the regulation of the industry by the CAB.
116 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 80 (1944) (emphasis added).
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In Butler Aviation Company v. C.A.B," 7 decided in 1968, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals declined review of the Board's approval of the acquisition of a fixed base operator by a scheduled carrier. The opinion, by Judge
Friendly, expressed the view that the Board "has properly concluded in the light
of the immunity from the antitrust laws conferred by Section 414, that it must
consider auticompetitive effects less extreme than those limned by the proviso"8
in determining whether transactions will be 'consistent with the public interest'
as defined in Section 102,19 . . ." Thus, the Board is to apply tests relating to
competition, among other things, and must approve "if, but only if, it finds that
the disadvantage of any curtailment in competition to be outweighed by the
advantages of improved service."' 20 This decision provides an interesting contrast
with Cartage,which would have the Board deny "unless." It plugs in smoothly
enough to Section 102 from which it gets its energy, and it is consistent with
McLean.
justice Douglas, who had dissented in McLean, was the author of the
Supreme Court's opinion in Pan American Airways v. U. S."2I decided in 1963.
This was a civil suit brought by the United States under the terms of the Sherman
Act charging restraint of trade, i.e., agreements between carriers for limitation of
routes and division of territories. The Court held that the Board and not the
courts had primary jurisdiction of the matter, that the Federal Aviation Act was
the pertinent statute, and among other things said:
...
That regime has its special standard of the "public interest" as defined
by Congress. The standards to be applied by the Board in enforcing the
Act are broadly stated in § 2. (Now Section 102, FederalAviation Act.)

The "present and future needs" of our foreign and domestic commerce,
regulations that foster "sound economic conditions," the promotion of service
117 Butler Aviation Co. v. C.A.B. 389 F.2d 517 (2nd Cir. 1968).
118 First proviso of § 408(b), supra note 89, discussed hereinafter.
119 The court cited American Airlines, Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, 7 C.A.B. 365
(1946). In this case the Board said:
These underlying circumstances of size and competitive position are critical factors
in measuring the application now before us against the standards of public interest set
forth in section 2 (now Section 102) of the Act, in particular, the injunctions to promote sound economic conditions in air transportation (subsection (b)) and to consider
in the public interest competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air transportation system properly adapted to our needs (subsection (d)).
7 C.A.B. at 378.
120 Concerning the scope of the exemption coverage of Section 414 the court later said in
the Butler opinion: "We read section 414 . . . as declaring that in the areas there delimited
the public interest demands that if a transaction has survived examination by the . . . agency,
antitrust peace shall prevail.... Congress - had it considered the matter - might well have
wished to guard agencies against a subconscious temptation to neglect through assessment of
anticompetitive considerations on the basis that the transaction would remain open to later
attack by the Attorney General or in a private suit - remedies too slow and doubtful in these
areas of particular public concern. .. ." Butler was followed in National Aviation Trades Association, C.A.B., 420 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1969) involving an operating lease of a public airport
by a scheduled carrier, wherein the court said: "... . This duty arises from the explanation of
the 'public interest' standard set forth in section 102'(d) of the Act, . . . and presumably from
the inclusion of this same term in section 408. . . ." By per curiam order in Conroy Aviation
Corporationv. C.A.B., (D.C. Cir. 1970), which was not an acquisition but an exemption case
arising under Section 416(b) the court said concerning antitrust contentions: "... . The Board
must examine antitrust factors and explicate its reasons for its ruling so that this court may
review the basis for the determination. .. "
121 Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).

[Vol. 47:32]

ROLE OF THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

free of "unfair or destructive competitive practices," regulations that produce
the proper degree of "competition"--each of these is pertinent to the problems arising under Section 411.
It would be strange, indeed, if a division of territories or an allocation
of routes which met the requirements of the "public interest" as defined in
§ 2 (Section 102, Federal Aviation Act) were held to be antitrust violations ....122
In evaluating mergers, and unlike the 412 agreement situations, it may be
necessary for the Board to consider the effect on competition in two ways. As
has been shown Section 408 (b) first states that the Board shall approve unless it
finds that the merger will not be consistent with the public interest or that the
conditions of the section will not be fulfilled. This calls for evaluation under
Section 102 and, depending on the facts, the Board can find that prospective
competition is adequate or that none is required. A following condition, however, is that of the "first proviso," which prohibits approval of a merger "which
would result in creating a monopoly and thereby restrain competition...." If
the merger passes the first test it must nevertheless be subjected to the latter one.
In one of the very early merger cases, 2 8 the Board appointed Dean Roscoe
Pound of the Harvard Law School to act as a special examiner. Pound, who
favored approval, expressed the view that the language of the Declaration of
Policy was the proper guide to the meaning of "competition" as used in the
proviso. In his unreported initial decision he put it this way:
The proviso in Section 408(b) as to the effect in restraining competition and the clause in Section 2 (now section 102) defining the policy of the
Act should be construed together so as to give 408(b) a meaning consonant
with what the statute itself declares to be its purpose.... The statute does
not announce a policy of competition at all events and in every possible
way. It is competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air transpoitation system properly adapted to the needs of commerce, of the postal service, and of the national defense, which is to be
regarded....
In reversing the Board did not reach this question but nevertheless predicated its denial solely on the public interest standards of Section 102.12. Its first
effort at interpreting the proviso was made in a companion case, United A. L.Western A. E., Interchange of Equipment, decided the same day, wherein the
Board in part said:
. ..restraint of competition is a factor, insofar as the application of the
proviso is concerned, only if it results from that degree . . . which the
Authority (now Board) decides constitutes a monopoly of air transportation.1 25
"Restraint of competition or jeopardy to another air carrier is not enough to
122
123
124
125

Id. at 308-09.
Acquisition of Western A.E. by United Airlines, 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940).
Id.
United Airlines-Western A.E., Interchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723, 724 (1940).
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trigger the proviso unless brought about by the creation of a monopoly; per
contra, the creation of a monopoly is not enough unless it would restrain competition or jeopardize a nonparty air carrier."'2 6 The Board in practice has looked
closely at cause and effect and has not tended to expand upon the proviso by
construction. Thus it was not applied in a case where "the consolidated operator
1 7
will continue to receive real competition;"'n
in another where "the company...
will not be able to control air transportation generally in that region, . . . the
available traffic has not supported parallel services in the past, and there are no
existing facts or reasons in the record indicating a traffic potential which would
warrant such services in the future;"' 2 8 in another involving a number of markets
but there was only one "instance of significance in which competition will be
removed" and "it appears that additional services will result;' " "' and in another,
a similar case, where it was "evident that a reduction from two carriers to one
will have only a slight impact on the traveling public."'3 °
In looking at cause and effect in the United-CapitalMerger Case in 196 1, "'
involving the elimination of competition in several markets, some of them large,
and in which it granted approval, the Board borrowed the failing business
doctrine of International Shoe,'3 2 a case which arose under the Clayton Act,
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1930. In affirming, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, speaking through Judge Prettyman,
had, among other things, the following to say:
. . . The proviso was clearly aimed, in both language and intendment, at
mergers which would create monopoly. The merger in the matter at bar did
not create or tend to create monopoly. Indeed it probably, as the Board
found, forestalled or at least cushioned a monopolistic development. There
were a few segments of the total routes in which only one carrier was left
(including four major "markets"), but these were minor in the whole picture.
An erstwhile hearty competitor in a vast area was about to collapse and
pass from the picture. Had this happened, the field would have been left to
the remaining operators, thus with less competition and closer to monopoly.
As it was, the merger brought a new and hearty competitor into the area.
Those already there had more competition and thus less monopoly than they
had theretofore had. We agree with the Board that this proviso of Section
408 had little to do with this problem....
Counsel argue this point in terms of the "failing business doctrine"
and the International Shoe case. We think we need not try to fit this
problem as we have it, into ready-made doctrinaire styles or sizes; the matter
is clear enough on the face of the facts and the statute without intermediate
measurements. 133

126 Butler Aviation Co. v. C.A.B., 389 F.2d 517, 519 (2nd Cir. 1968).
127 Wien Alaska Airways, Acquisition Mirow Air Service, 3 C.A.B. 207. 213 (1941).
128 Marine Airways, Alaska Air Transport Consolidation, 3 C.A.B. 315, 319 '(1942).
129 Braniff Airlines-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708. 734, 735 (1952).
130 Allegheny-Lake Central Merger Case, Dkt. 19151, I.D. 40 (April, 1968).
131 United-Capital Merger Case, 33 C.A.B. 307, 308, 309 (1961).
132 International Shoe Co. v. F.T.C., 280 U.S. 291 (1930); cf. American-Trans Caribbean
Merger Case, Dkt. 21828 (1970); Aloha-Hawaiian Merger Case, Dkt. 22435, I.D. Examiner
Milton H. Shapiro (Feb., 1971).
133 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 303 F.2d 395, 401-02 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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VI. Conclusion
In reviewing the thirty-two years of route development under the Act, and
in the background of its origins, it undoubtedly appears that the Board has
wandered to some extent in its certification policy, and that in matters of mergers
and acquisitions of control it may have assumed procedural and decisional
burdens differing from and more formidable than those contemplated by the
authors of the Act, and potentially tolerant of results not anticipated in their
planning.
As to certification it is to be observed that if the Board had consistently
followed its policy expressions made in stormy weather, a route system adequate
to serve the public would not have developed. On the other hand, if it had consistently followed those expressions made in fair weather a system beyond the
capacity of the economy to support would likely have evolved. Hence a policy
pronouncement at any reading of the economic barometer and intended for
permanent use is to be regarded with caution, albeit, if successfully accomplished,
such a pronouncement might itself be conducive to a more constant economic
climate. As to the Cartage doctrine there may be doubt as to the extent that
ultimate results in cases have in fact been affected, for similar results are ordinarily
possible under the less cumbersome statutory standard of "competition to the
extent necessary." Furthermore, although the doctrine may tend to perpetuate
economic uneasiness, it does not tend to introduce it.
The act of balancing between too little competition on the one hand, and
too much on the other, results in a much different state of affairs, and certainly,
from the standpoint of the regulators, a much more complex state of affairs than
would exist either under regulated monopoly or unregulated competition. The
principle of limited competition is entirely adequate, however, to afford many of
the benefits and avoid many of the detriments of both systems. Competition, for
example, is entirely adequate to provide a constant thrust to the carriers to seek
ways and means to improve services. The manufacturers in turn understand this
very well and seek ways and means to take advantage of it. They know that
whenever they produce a new type aircraft that is superior to its predecessors
in economy, comfort, safety, and speed that carriers will buy it, some of them
to attain competitive advantage and others to maintain competitive position.
Furthermore, because limits are placed upon the extent of competition, they can
have some confidence in the integrity of the industry and in its ability to pay for
its purchases and to support its services.'
Carriers and manufacturers have performed accordingly and the nature of
the service now available to the public bears but remote resemblance to that
prevailing when the scheme was introduced. Undoubtedly the long distances
134

One author has stated:
t .. [I]t is reasonably fair to say that the Congressional decision of 1938 amounted
to a determination that a new agency of five men, vested with sweeping authority,
should see to it that an infant transport industry, of more than passing importance to
our military power, should be spared the evils of overbuilding, wasteful competitive
warfare, bankruptcies, rate discrimination, and business piracy which, in surface
transportation, had concerned Congress for many years before it took remedial action.
Westwood, Choice of the Air Carrier for New Air Transport Routes, 16 GEo. WASH. L. RMV.
2 (1947).
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between cities and the strength of the economy would have had a positive effect
on the quality of equipment and services in any event. But it would be interesting
to speculate on the type of aircraft and methods of operation which might be in
use if this thrust had not been provided by the federal regulatory statutes. They
would hardly have been the same. This also is true as to air transportation elsewhere for most of the fine aircraft in use all over the world were manufactured in
this country and designed initially to exploit its markets.
Under this scheme an air transportation system has evolved which for
operational efficiency, extent and quality of services, economy and reasonable
fare levels, is of unparalleled excellence. It is a splendid system and, despite its
present difficulties which have proved to be cyclical, it splendidly serves the
public interest. In 1969 the air carriers' share, measured in passenger miles, of
commercial intercity transportation in this country, amounted to 240 percent of
that performed in 1938 by all modes-rail, bus, water, and air-combined.3 5
Even after allowing for a population increase of 55.5 percent, the public's
welcome to the quality of its air transportation system is evident.
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